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A broadened typology describing the interconnection between energy and security is developed in this
paper, with the aim of improving understanding of the relationship between energy and security by
applying different research and policy perspectives. One approach involves studying energy as an object
exposed to security threats, using concepts such as security of supply or security of demand. Another
approach involves studying the role of the energy system as the subject in generating or enhancing
insecurity. The latter approach includes studying the conﬂict-generating potential inherent in the eco-
nomic value of energy, the risk of accidents and antagonistic attacks to energy infrastructure and the
security risks related to the negative environmental impact of the energy system. In order to make a
comprehensive analysis of the security consequences of proposed energy policies or strategies, all these
aspects should be taken into account to varying degrees. The typology proposed here could be a valuable
tool for ensuring that all security aspects have been considered.
 2013 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Energy is an essential commodity for a well-functioning society.
The availability of low cost energy has historically been one of the
main factors contributing to economic development and an im-
proved standard of living. At the same time, energy contributes
heavily to several of the most important environmental problems,
especially climate change. The modern energy system has developed
into a network of energy interconnections (global, regional and local)
and the economic values involved in the transactions are huge.1
The concept of energy security is frequently highlighted in
policy texts and in academic literature, but with different conno-
tations depending on the professional, political and geographical
background of the user, see e.g. Refs. [2,3]. Energy security is often
implicitly used as a synonym for security of supply, particularly by
researchers applying an economic perspective, see e.g. Ref. [4].
Security of supply is deﬁned broadly as adequate, affordable and
reliable supplies of energy. However, in other forums, the rela-
tionship between energy and security is seen from the perspective
that energy can be an important contributor to conﬂicts and other
security threats. These two perspectives are seldom combined intockholm, Sweden. Tel.: þ46
.johansson@miljo.lth.se.
consumption to be about 7%
Y-NC-ND license.analysis. However, Hoogeveen and Perlot [5] touch upon this in
identifying the two fears, dating back to the 1970s oil crisis, that
create the grounds for EU energy security policy, namely the risk of
regional tensions leading to a disruption in oil and the fear that
energy will be wilfully used as a weapon, cf. also [3]. Similarly,
Chaudry et al. [6], referring to the UK DECC, state that energy se-
curity can be divided into physical security (uninterrupted supply),
price security and geopolitical security.
Security of supply plays an important role in energy policy,
together with industrial competitiveness and sustainability, see e.g.
Ref. [7], and it also overlaps other policy arenas such as en-
vironmental policy, security policy, foreign policy and business and
trade policy. Energy as a contributor to conﬂicts and other security
threats is usually dealt with in foreign policy and security policy
(in its wider deﬁnition also including critical infrastructure
protection).
The aim of this study was to establish and elaborate a broad ty-
pology for categorising energy and security issues that would allow
us to include both perspectives mentioned above. Recent related
efforts elaborating on parts of this ﬁeld can be found for example in
Refs. [6,8,9]. The typology could be a useful tool when analysing
various policy initiatives. One important areawould for example be
when analysing climate mitigation strategies. Energy security as-
pects are sometimes discussed in climate policy studies but the
aspects included are usually limited. Using the typology proposed
here could be a useful framework for providing a fuller picture of the
impact of climate policies, positive or negative, to security.
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concepts (which are seldom explicitly discussed in existing energy
security studies) and the different threats to security that can be
identiﬁed. Following from that, twomain approaches to energy and
security (energy system as object to security threats or as subject
generating or enhancing insecurity) are developed.2. Security concepts and their relevance for energy
One way to deﬁne security is as the absence of threats, but se-
curity can scarcely be understood without relating it to an actor,
activity, technology or system. Furthermore, security can have both
an objective and a subjective dimension. While the objective
dimension can include factors that can be measured against
external criteria, the subjective dimension can be deﬁned as the
individual perception of being safe (secure). Subjective security,
which might be of great importance for policy, does not have to be
correlated to changes in the indicators used for measuring objective
security [10].
Threats and crises can be man-made (deliberate and acci-
dental) or follow from natural causes [11]. Furthermore, threats to
a system can be both external and internal. Energy policies can
deal with both internal and external security threats. For example,
the energy security policy of the EU, see e.g. Ref. [12], deals with
both internal threats (e.g. poor infrastructure and inefﬁcient
markets) and external threats (e.g. dependence on unreliable
imports).
In the security discourse a distinction is often made between
national or state-centric security and human security. National
security traditionally deals with the protection of the national state
and its functions, while human security focuses on the security of
individual citizens, see e.g. Ref. [13]. The United Nations Develop-
ment Programme [14] introduced two main aspects of human se-
curity: safety from chronic threats such as hunger, disease and
repression; and protection from sudden and harmful disruptions in
the pattern of daily life. The UNDP has furthermore deﬁned seven
different categories of human security; environment, economic,
food, health, personal, community and political security. There is a
link between the state-centric and human concept in that the state
often (but not always) plays an important role in preserving humanEnergy and s
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Fig. 1. The analytical structure used in this paper to ssecurity and vice versa [15]. In addition to the concepts of national
and human security the stability of the international state system is
important in a globalised world, since instability can pose threats to
important ﬂows of goods and people necessary for providing na-
tional and human security.
Another concept of relevance is societal safety [16], which could
be deﬁned as society’s ability tomaintain critical social functions, to
protect the life and health of citizens and to meet citizens’ basic
requirements in a variety of stress situations. It deals with extraor-
dinary stresses and losses that require a response beyond routine
capacities and operations. According to Ref. [16], societal safety in-
cludes other concepts such as national security, human security,
sustainable development and incident management. Another
concept of relevance for energy and currently stressed in policy is
critical infrastructure protection (see e.g. Refs. [17e19]), which is
often used within the civil protection policy arena. Energy is often
highlighted as one of society’s vital functions and critical infra-
structure together with health protection, the payment system, etc.
Energy and security can be discussed using all these approaches
to security. In our further analysis we found it fruitful to view en-
ergy and security ﬁeld from two different angles. In the ﬁrst, the
energy system can be seen as an object that should be protected
from external security threats thus enabling it to provide the ser-
vices necessary for most societal functions. In the second the en-
ergy system is viewed as a subject and one of several factors that, in
a broader sense, could pose threats to human, national and societal
security, see Fig. 1. In the following sections these two perspectives
are elaborated upon in more detail.
3. Energy system as object: securing energy supply and
demand
Energy security in the meaning of securing a well-functioning
energy system has at least two aspects, security of supply and se-
curity of demand. The relative importance of these aspects depends
on the role of the actor or the country within the energy economy.
3.1. Security of supply
For most actors and countries, security of supply is the most
important aspect and is also the ﬁeld most commonly discussed inecurity
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Table 1
Areas worth protecting, threats to security of supply and primary, secondary and tertiary causes of these threats. The list is not intended to be exhaustive.
Areas worth protecting,
examples
Threats, examples Primary causes, examples Secondary causes, examples Tertiary causes, examples
- Human health
- Economic growth
- Public safety
- Trust in political system
- Trust in energy
companies
- Energy interruptions
- Price shocks
- Long-term high
price levels
- Technical errors
- Handling errors
- Weather events
- Antagonistic events
(terrorism, blockades, etc.)
- Imbalance between
supply and demand
- Lack of physical energy
resources
- Lack of investment in
maintenance
- Lack of education
- Lack of investment in
physical security
- Lack of investment in search
and exploration
- Lack of investment in
alternative energy
- Poorly functioning markets
- Inadequate regulation
- Unstable political conditions in
producer countries
- Unstable political conditions in
countries key for distribution
- Unsuccessful development of
alternative energy sources
2 There are different views in the literature as to whether the reduced role for
fossil fuels (especially oil) will primarily be driven by resource constraints or by
climate policy and whether the pre-warning time is enough for managing the
balance between supply and demand, see e.g. Refs. [30,31,32,33,34.35,36].
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important role of energy for the functioning of modern society. Oil
and gas often play a central role due to its pivotal position in the
global energy system. Deﬁnitions of energy security in the meaning
of security of supply usually include an availability aspect (stable
and uninterrupted supply) and a price aspect (see e.g. Refs. [20e
22]). A variant, energy services security [23], is based on the
recognition that it is not energy per se but the energy services it
provides that is important for the consumer or society as a whole.
Much interest is directed to the availability of global and national
energy resources, the functionality of energy infrastructure, energy
diversity and the development of functioning and transparent
markets (see e.g. Ref. [24]).
Security of supply (or energy services) depends on a chain of
well-functioning infrastructure and networks stretching from en-
ergy extraction through transportation, transformation, reﬁning
and distribution all the way to energy end use. Potential natural or
human threats to the functioning of the system occur all along
these chains. The importance of a well-functioning network has
made energy dependency a central concept in the energy security
discourse. However, there is no exact deﬁnition of energy de-
pendency and there is also an ongoing discussion as to the degree of
importance that should be attributed to this factor (see e.g. Refs.
[25,26]), and whether gaining energy independency is important
for increasing security of supply.
The threats to security of supply can be of differing characters in
terms of type of negative effect, time-frame and cause of the threat.
The main negative effects that threaten the interests and values of
nations and individual consumers are energy interruptions, see e.g.
Refs. [27e29], and price increases resulting from long or short term
imbalances between supply and demand (see e.g. Ref. [26]).
Twodifferent timeaspects are relevant fordealingwith threats to
the security of supply, namely the level of permanence of a distur-
bance and the prior warning time expected before a disturbance.
First, the longer the disturbance, the greater are the expected
consequences. The acceptance for short-term effects and the strate-
gies to deal with these are signiﬁcantly different to those attached to
longer interruptions and imbalances. For example, a short-term price
spike can be more easily assimilated in the economy than longer
periods of high prices eating up more of the economy’s resources.
Similarly, an electricity blackout of a few seconds causes much less
impact and is generally more accepted than a blackout lasting for
many hours and even days. Furthermore, for shorter fuel supply in-
terruptions, energy reserves could be released to reduce price hikes
but this method would be less feasible for long-term imbalances.
Second,with a long priorwarning time the potential disturbance
and its consequences can more easily be mitigated by proactive
behaviour. For example, dramatic suddenprice increases could have
more serious consequences than a slow increase, to which econo-
mies can adjust over time [3]. If there is an appropriate response to
signals, the longer term issue of a necessary diminishing role offossil fuel resources could be handled through investments in other
energy sources, energy efﬁciency improvements, etc.2
The threats to security of supply can be viewed as multi-level
effects, see Table 1. First, there are primary causes leading to in-
terruptions or market imbalances. They could consist of inadequate
production capacity, technical or operational errors, weather events
or antagonistic behaviour such as terror attacks, blockades, wars,
etc. These primary causes could affect all parts of the energy chain,
but the consequences for the consumer would vary depending on
their location. Effects appearing near the consumer would pose a
greater risk of supply interruption, for example through blackouts
in the case of electricity. Disturbances at fuel extraction facilities,
reﬁneries or electricity production plants, etc., which are situated
far from the consumer, would be less likely to lead to interruptions
in a well-functioning market but, due to the resulting imbalances
between supply and demand, could instead lead to price effects,
creating a new balance between supply and demand.
These direct causes often depend, at least partly, on indirect
causes. Indirect causes could include lack of new investment in ca-
pacity and quality, lack of maintenance of existing systems, lack of
education, lack of physical protection and political unrest. On a
higher level, malfunctioning markets and other institutions, as well
as inadequate regulation, could be underlying causes leading to
inadequate investments in for example capacity, functionality and
protective measures. Furthermore, unclear legal status of
geographical areas could hinder the exploitation of resources, see
e.g. Refs. [37,38]. Lack of transparency and lack of trust in the reli-
ability of countries for exploration are often stressed as being of
great importance for impeding furtheroil exploration inmanyareas,
aswell as for enhancing price volatility [39,40]. The lack of economic
distribution of the wealth emanating from energy exploitation
could lead topolitically unstable conditions,whichmight hinder the
development of energy extraction within countries, see also next
chapter. Measures and strategies, both proactive and reactive, that
mitigate the risk of disturbance comprise in themselves an impor-
tantﬁeld for energy and security studies, but are not included in this
paper. It should be noted, however, that these strategies and mea-
sures could target primary, secondary as well as tertiary causes.
Security of supply is analysed using both quantitative and
qualitativemethods. In the literature, much effort has been devoted
to developing and using various indicators to compare different
energy systems with regard to security aspects (see e.g. Refs.
[4,21,26,41e46]), and to evaluating strategies for strengthening
security of supply, see e.g. Refs. [28,47,48]. The indicators include
for example import dependency ratios, diversity indices (including
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of the cost of disturbance (blackouts as well as price hikes).
3.2. Security of demand
For energy exporting countries, security of demand may be
equally important to security of supply. Both the economy in gen-
eral and the national budget can be heavily dependent on income
from energy exports, cf. [5]. The role of the energy sector in this
case is comparable to that of other important industrial sectors,
with the difference that the energy sector in a few countries totally
dominates the economy. For example, the oil industry contributes
45% of GDP in Saudi Arabia, 80% of budget revenues and 90% of
exports [49]. For budgetary reasons it is of great interest for
exporting governments that income remains stable, and thus price
volatility is a great concern (cf. [39]), as is keeping transportation
routes functioning.
Stable prices and open transportation routes form mutual in-
terests shared with the energy consuming countries. However,
conﬂicting views between producers (e.g. OPEC) and consumers
may arise regarding price levels and optimal exploration rates, cf.
[50]. Consuming countries wish to keep energy prices at as low
level as possible without hampering the development of enough
supply tomeet demand. The producing countries on the other hand
gain from keeping the price as high as possible as long as it does not
lead to signiﬁcant losses in demand. Climate policy is also often
seen as a major threat to the security of demand of oil-exporting
countries as it would give incentives for energy efﬁciency and
expansion of renewable energy. Persson et al. [51] have, however,
challenged this reasoning as being too simplistic as climate policy
would lead to even greater cost increases for unconventional oil
and synthetic diesel from coal which, in a world of dwindling oil
resources, might set the long-term price for liquid fuels. Thus the
price on oil would go beyond an applied CO2 fee, increasing the rent
on conventional oil.
4. Energy system as subject: a generator of insecurity or
threat multiplier
Energy could act as a generator of insecurity in several ways. The
security effects can be divided into those that are mainly a result of
the economic importance of energy, the physical and technical
characteristics of the energy carriers and the environmental con-
sequences of energy use, cf. Fig. 1. All these aspects are discussed
further below, see also Table 2.Table 2
Values worth protecting, energy-generated threats and potential causes of these.
The list is not exhaustive.
Values worth
protecting,
examples
‘Energy-generated’
threats, examples
Causes, examples
- Peace
- State stability
- Democratic
institutions
- National inﬂuence
- Human health
- Economic assets
- Natural
environment
- Struggle over resource-
rich areas
- Energy blockades
- Energy as a factor in
political negotiations
- Internal wars and conﬂicts
- Accidents (hydro, nuclear, oil)
- Terrorism (hydro, nuclear, oil)
- Criminal acts (blackmail, etc.)
- Climate change
- Economic value of
energy
- Dependence on
speciﬁc energy
supplier
- Uneven distribution
of wealth
- Lack of investment
in technology and
competence
- Lack of physical
protection
- Carbon dioxide
emissions4.1. Economic and political risk factors
International conﬂicts arising from the competition for scarce
resources could be attributed to the economic aspects of energy.
Thus, ongoing or potential conﬂicts over small islands or water
areas, for example in the South China Sea and the Arctic Regions,
are often attributed to the existence of potentially valuable en-
ergy resources, see e.g. Refs. [3,37,52e56]. Furthermore, it has
often been argued that US military activities in the Middle East,
e.g. Iraq, are motivated by the urge to control the energy supply,
taking its starting point in the so-called Carter doctrine [57]. The
opposite standpoint is also found in the literature; with argu-
ments that there is no economic rationale for trying to take
control of the oil in Iraq by military means, see e.g. Ref. [58].
Others argue that US intervention, rather than securing its own
energy interests, forms part of securing generic interests of
global capitalism as a whole [59].
Furthermore, the economic value of energy can encourage and
enable countries to strengthen their geopolitical position. This
can be based on their role as dominant supplier, prominent
investor and/or consumer, see e.g. Refs. [37,60]. One example of a
country trying to exercising the power of a prominent supplier is
Russia. A signiﬁcant amount of literature deals with the security
policy implications of its energy relations with neighbouring
countries including the EU, see e.g. Refs. [24,25,61e63]. Some
analysts also report that Chinese investments are sometimes
exchanged for political support on general political stances in the
global arena, see e.g. Ref. [64]. In addition, blockades directed
towards energy suppliers have been used from time to time (e.g.
in relation to Iran and Iraq) with the purpose of achieving po-
litical goals. Renewable energy sources are often seen as less risky
from a security policy perspective. There is a discussion, however,
whether for example the development of large-scale solar power
in North Africa, largely for import to the EU, would create new
dependencies with security policy implications for Europe, see
e.g. Ref. [65].
One important aspect of the energy and security connections is
the regional insecurity that abundant energy resources (and other
natural resources) can help generate, often in poorer countries
(often called the ‘resource curse’). The underlying reasons can be
uneven distribution of wealth, corruption and reduced incentives
to build functioning institutions.3 Examples of this can be found for
example in Nigeria and Ogaden in Ethiopia [24,57,67]. Concerns
have more recently been raised that the on-going large scale
expansion of biofuels could create new conﬂicts when large scale
plantations substitute small-scale framing creating potential con-
ﬂicts between international companies and local communities (For
example, Van den Horst and Vermeylen [68] discuss the conse-
quences for indigenous and minority communities of the on-going
biofuel expansion).
Finally, the economic value of energy as well as its technological
characteristics (see below) could attract the attention of terrorist
groups [69], but whether energy infrastructure is an attractive
target for terrorists can be discussed. For example, Toft et al. [70]
see only minor incentives for terror groups to attack energy infra-
structure, as such attacks generate limited attention among the
public, while other more newsworthy targets are also less well
protected than energy installations.3 Humphreys [66] presents six mechanisms by which resource (not only energy)
abundance can create civil conﬂicts: i) the greedy rebels mechanism ii) the greedy
outsiders mechanism iii) the grievance mechanism iv) the feasibility mechanism v)
the weak states mechanism and vi) the weak networks mechanism.
B. Johansson / Energy 53 (2013) 199e205 2034.2. Technological risk factors
The second area of security and safety threats emanating from
energy systems is grounded in the physical and technological prop-
erties of energy, generating various risks of natural/technical hazards
and antagonistic threats. Damage to hydroelectric dams, oil tankers,
gas depots and nuclear plants, emanating from technical and oper-
ating errors, can have devastating effects on both nearby and more
distant areas, see e.g. Refs. [71,72]. As mentioned above, these plants
are also potential targets for terror groups [69,70]. Furthermore, with
nuclear energy there is an associated risk of proliferation of nuclear
weapons, as the capacity to enrich nuclear fuel is closely related to the
capacity to produce nuclearweapons, and the plutoniumproduced as
a by-product in reactors is a viable resource for nuclear weapon
production, see e.g. Refs. [73e76]. Nuclearwaste could also be a target
for criminal groups (possibly to sell illegally or as an object for
blackmailing activities) or terrorists [77].
4.3. Environmental risk factors
Finally, security aspects are frequently discussed in relation to
climate change, see e.g. Refs. [13,78]. In these cases climate change
is often argued to act as a threat multiplier, enhancing existing
stresses for many societies. As fossil fuel combustion is the most
important contributor to climate change, energy is here indirectly a
potential source of insecurity. Climate policy measures to reduce
fossil fuel use may also generate conﬂicts among nations, creating
new security risks, see e.g. Refs. [13,79,80].
Other risk factors of relevance are the effects of air pollution
which poses a severe threat to human health and thus human se-
curity, not the least in developing countries where small-scale
wood burning causing many deaths etc [81]. Energy exploitation
also puts stress on water resources is also an important aspect not
the least with the expansion of non-conventional fuels produced
from tar sands and oil shale, see e.g. Gavrilova et al. [82].
Large-scale expansion of biomass could in the future be a new
stress factor to biodiversity, see e.g. Ref. [83]. This could be the case
even if the biomass plantations themselves have little negative
impact on biodiversity (or even be locally advantageous compared
to current land-use practises), through secondary effects where
current land-use forms are moving to other and more extensively
managed lands (so-called indirect land use change) [84].
5. Discussion
The typology developed above is one way to structure the ﬁeld
of energy and security. It could support a comprehensive evaluation
of various energy systems or policy initiativeswith regard to energy
and security aspects. Policy initiatives that will have an impact on
the relationship between energy and security can be found in a
broad range of policy areas, such as energy policy, foreign and se-
curity policy, civil protection policy, environmental and climate
policy. The typology developed stresses the fact that energy and
security can be viewed from several different perspectives. One
main dividing line lies between security issues, where the energy
system is an object of security threats, and where it is a subject that
generates or enhances insecurity.
The boundary between the different perspectives is not clear-
cut, however. For example, at the same time as regional conﬂicts
could sometimes be partly a consequence of the availability of
energy resources and poor distribution of the wealth generated,
those conﬂicts could hamper the exploitation of available resources
and hence affect security of supply. In a similar way, the potential
attractiveness of energy infrastructures for terror attacks, if exer-
cised in reality, would not only lead to direct security effects andpotential casualties, but would also indirectly affect energy
markets.
With a broad approach to security, most disturbances could be
framed as security issues, at least if they are of signiﬁcant magni-
tude. Use of security as a concept for framing an energy issue can
have several different motives. One motive may be to give the en-
ergy issue a higher priority within politics, since the securitisation
of an issue such as energy can enable it to be excluded from the
normal decision-making process [85]. Conversely, the traditional
security actors might want to ﬁnd new areas of potential conﬂicts
and threats, which could motivate a continuous ﬂow of resources
into the security sector. In line with this argument, Moran and
Russell [86] stress that overemphasis on the possibility of great
power conﬂicts in the energy ﬁeld favours important, and generally
conservative, institutional interests within the defence establish-
ment of developed states, particularly in the US. Furthermore,
although a conﬂict discourse around energy is widespread, some
studies instead highlight the mutual beneﬁts of cooperation be-
tween consumers and producers [87]. According to those authors,
the suppliers’ quest for supply security is met by the producers’
quest for demand security.
The approaches to energy and security can differ between
countries depending on the structure of the energy system and
historical experiences. This can be illustrated by the various lines
chosen by the different member states within the EU, where e.g. the
degreeof relianceonRussian gas andhistorical experiences fromthe
ColdWarhave led todifferent approaches to energy security, see e.g.
Ref. [88]. Historical experiences may also affect the relative priority
given to energy security compared with environmental factors.
Within energy policy, the security aspect of energy is only one
aspect. The competitiveness of the industry is a central area of in-
terest in most countries. Energy security priorities, such as
increasing the reliability of the energy system, might incur extra
costs, which could be negative from the perspective of competi-
tiveness. Thus, ﬁnding a balance between security-enhancing
measures and efﬁcient energy systems is an area that requires
further research. Some measures, such as cost-effective energy ef-
ﬁciency improvements and creating stable conditions for invest-
ment in new production facilities can serve the purposes of both
energy security and competitiveness.
Measures that reduce the climate impact of the energy system
could have an effect on security of supply and vice versa. For
example, restrictions in the use of coal, due to its negative impact
on the climate, could lead to even greater dependencies on more
concentrated resources such as natural gas. Climate policy could
also pose restrictions on some strategies for diversifying energy
supply, such as replacing petroleum with non-conventional oil, as
the latter usually produces signiﬁcantly higher emissions per unit
of ﬁnal energy. However, removing obstacles for energy efﬁciency
can be advantageous for security of supply, competitiveness and
climate.
Much of the literature on energy and security focuses on the
current or near-term situation and on oil and natural gas. Although
current dependencies will also be relevant in the future, new de-
pendencies will most likely develop. New international ﬂows of
renewable energy in the form of biofuels, hydrogen and electricity
could create new security issues. At the same time as new long-
distance energy ﬂows are developed, distributed production sys-
tems could develop in parallel, with both potential security ad-
vantages and disadvantages. The implementation of new policy
regimes could generate new security issues by imposing re-
strictions on nations using fossil fuels that can be assumed to be
necessary for their development or, in other nations, by hampering
their possibilities to harvest the economic value of their fossil fuel
resources [13,79].
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porting a broader analysis of the security consequences of future
policy regimes, not the least climate policy. For example, in Ref. [89]
an earlier version of the typology was used for identifying security
aspects related to a future major expansion of renewable energy
sources. The study showed both positive security aspects of
renewable energy (e.g. the independence of exhaustible resources),
several similarities with current systems regarding the dependence
of well-functioning technical systems and potential reasons for
concern regarding how to handle variable electricity production,
dependence of new potentially instable regions, and the strain on
food security and biodiversity of an increased use of biomass.
Furthermore in an on-going project,4 the scenarios in the EU
energy roadmap [90] and other relevant scenarios are analysed
using the typology presented here. Although energy security is
analysed shortly in the impact assessment of the EU energy road-
map, this analysis is limited to a few, mainly quantiﬁable, aspects of
energy security. A better understanding of the relations between
energy and security could enhance the opportunities for devel-
oping national and supranational policy strategies with a good
balance between environmental, economic and security objectives.
In addition to applying the typology, a further development of
speciﬁc methodologies (quantitative and qualitative) is important
in order to deepen the understanding of various security aspects
relating to energy system transformations (see e.g. Ref. [91]).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, a typology is presented that describes the relation
between energy and security in a way that integrate several per-
spectives found in the literature, perspectives that are often treated
separately from each other. Through this integration, the typology
can be useful as a theoretical basis for a broad analysis of security
aspects of various energy systems designs and energy policies.
The main structural feature of the typology is the dividing line
drawn between security issues, where the energy system is an object of
security threats, and where it is a subject that generates or enhances
insecurity to society. Each of these parts is further divided in smaller
elements. The security issues related to when energy systems is seen
as an object are divided in security of supply and security of demand,
whereas the security issues related to when the energy system is seen
as a subject are divided in economic and political, technological, and
environmental risk factors. As for most typologies, the division be-
tween the various elements is not clear-cut and some threats could be
classiﬁed as belonging to more than one of the deﬁned groups.
The typology can be used for broad interdisciplinary academic
analyses of the nexus between energy and security and as a support
in policy development processes. Although many of the building
blocks of the typology are included in existing policy analyses they
are too seldom integrated in broad comprehensive analyses.
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